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DISCUSSION
Religious Actors and Transitional
Justice
On Legitimacy and Accountability
A teary-eyed Desmond Tutu during a public hearing of the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission is emblematic for the South African transitional justice (TJ) process to the
extent that examining the Commission’s work without recalling the archbishop’s role in
its functioning could be considered a scholarly faux-pas. Hence, the question emerges: is
this a unique case or are there other Tutus out there? One statistical effort documents
the significant involvement of religious actors in 8 of 10 strong truth commissions and 2
of 4 punitive processes (criminal prosecutions and vetting initiatives). Such trend is
curious if one assumes that TJ is built on the same pillars as its sister discipline,
international law: secularism and state-centrism. The present contribution aims to probe
this apparent inconsistency.
 Why are religious actors involved in state-sanctioned TJ?
In one perspective, the engagement with religious actors can be seen as an effort to
strengthen the legitimacy of human rights and humanitarian law within different
religious and cultural traditions by appealing to their ‘special’ legitimate authority.
Elsewhere, drawing on Max Weber’s work, I have argued that the legitimacy of religious
actors is primarily ascribed on traditional or charismatic grounds, as opposed to legal-
rational ones. To illustrate the attraction of this ‘special’ legitimacy, let us recall Daniel
Thürer’s acknowledgment that ‘law as such is powerless if it is not backed by forces
beyond the legal system, such as customs, public opinion or — religion’. An appeal to
religious actors would thus be validated when their religious interpretations support the
law and rebutted when it endangers it. Relying on religious actors as a strategy to lend
special legitimacy to TJ may carry particular weight in post-authoritarian and post-
conflict settings, where claims and needs for both local ownership and external
resources and structures are strong. Their support for and involvement in TJ
mechanisms—which otherwise could be perceived as foreign and divorced from context
—can prove instrumental. Indeed, Aaron P. Boesenecker and Leslie Vinjamuri show that,
in addition to civil society organizations, faith-based actors can act as norm adaptors and
are thus of crucial importance for ‘embedding’ an international criminal accountability
norm in various contexts.

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Should religious actors be involved in TJ?
A first objection to mixing religion and law can be termed the legality argument. On this
view, international law owes its very legal quality to a conscious separation from religion.
When applied to TJ, the legality argument carries some force. Over the past 20-30 years,
‘a comprehensive approach to TJ’ has increasingly been grounded in legal instruments.
This ‘new law’ of TJ relies cumulatively upon human rights law, humanitarian law, and
criminal law. Seeking the truth, pursuing criminal prosecutions, and reparation programs
and, to a certain extent, institutional reforms are today binding legal obligations—moral,
religious and other grounds would thus be of only secondary relevance. Be that as it may,
calling upon religious actors to strengthen the legitimacy of TJ in various cultural
contexts does not lead to a de-legalization (or a de-secularization) of TJ, nor does it
transform its primary legal-rational source of legitimacy.
Second, a neutrality argument insists that the law must rest on secular foundations if it
is to ensure equality and non-discrimination in a multi-religious and multi-cultural
world. The involvement of religious actors in TJ may raise tensions in contexts where
societies have experienced conflict across religious lines, or where a secular-religious
cleavage exists. On the other hand, some argue it may assuage religious tensions and
contribute to personal reconciliation when religious leaders of opposing parties seek to
work together.
A certain religious neutrality of the work of TJ mechanisms is warranted. The African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ ruling that non-Muslims and Muslims alike
have the right to be tried in non-religious courts if they so choose, would certainly also
apply to criminal prosecutions of alleged perpetrators of past violations. Beyond this,
when the proposition is embraced that TJ mechanisms must uphold the rule of law,
which in its ‘thick’ form includes freedom of and from religion, one finds support for the
argument that a (predominantly) religious character of a truth commission’s sessions and
its religiously-inspired findings may frustrate the rights of certain victims and alleged
perpetrators. A victim-centered approach to truth-seeking would also sanction a certain
neutrality, as some victims may feel uncomfortable with the religious contours of a truth
commission. Even so, the mere presence of religious actors in truth commissions would
not as such vitiate the rule of law requirement.
A third separationist claim could be called the denial/distortion of justice argument. It
fears that the involvement of religious actors in TJ may result in a denial of justice or its
distortion into ‘softer’ forms. Some see the actions of religious actors in TJ animated by a
logic of reconciliation grounded in forgiveness; this could lead them to advocate for
amnesties. To the extent that these are blanket amnesties or frustrate the right of victims
to a remedy and reparation they would collude with international law. One must
acknowledge that amnesties are promoted by a variety of actors, and governments,
including secular ones, have by far outdone religious actors. But certainly, there have
been cases where religious entities have specifically advocated amnesties such as in
Mozambique and Sierra Leone, and Uganda.
Accountability: the limit of religious actors’ involvement in TJ
Each of these three arguments holds some merit and indicates the limitations of religious
actors’ involvement in TJ. Yet, my research reveals that the strongest limit to such
involvement is the actors’ own legitimacy (or lack thereof), which in turn is intimately
linked to their accountability (or lack thereof). I reached this conclusion by linking the
roles of religious actors in the period of redress (or TJ) to the part they played in the
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period to be redressed. The roles of religious actors in authoritarianism or conflict, as
mediators, victims, accomplice to, or perpetrators of violations can shed light on the
roles which they assume in TJ processes, as advocates, agents or spoilers of TJ, or indeed
on their absence from such initiatives.
For example, during the Solomon Islands conflict, churches and women who typically
conduct their activities through church groups worked as indispensable providers of
emergency relief and services to victims and their families, and as mediators between
rival armed groups: they blended both capacity and legitimacy. Post-conflict, they
became champions of grassroots reconciliation, as well as advocates and agents of TJ,
including by assuming leading roles in disarmament initiatives.
On the other hand, in Rwanda, where clerics of established Christian churches were
among those accused for their role in the genocide (including at the ICTR), religious
actors were largely absent from state-sanctioned TJ mechanisms. The government
specifically excluded members of ‘leading organs of … a religious confession’ from
membership of Gacaca courts. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the number of followers
of Islam grew after the genocide because ‘Muslims seemed to have given a good account
of themselves during the massacres’—to buttress the link between accountability and
legitimacy, post-genocide we find Rwanda’s Mufti as a driving force of grassroots
reconciliation.
My research also found that the roles of religious entities in the period to be redressed
may influence the form of TJ they pursue; in addition to a religious logic of forgiveness,
this can also be shaped by ‘less-sacred’ aspects such as economic and political interests
or reputational loss.
To illustrate, in Romania, the Orthodox Church had a triadic position during the
communist regime: victim of repression, beneficiary of human rights violations (through
the transfer of church property of other denominations), and possible accomplice in
violations given its extensive collaboration with the regime. Post 1989, the Orthodox
Church again played a triadic role: memorializer – spoiler – opponent. Keen to
memorialize its own victimhood episodes to explain or legitimize its accommodation
with the regime, it was reluctant to engage in property restitution and vehemently
opposed disclosure of details of its collaboration with the secret police likely to protect
its economic and reputational interests.
In Tunisia, members of the Mouvement de Tendances Islamiques (re-named Ennahda)
suffered human rights violations at the hands of the Bourguiba and Ben Ali regimes and
their organization was largely excluded from political processes. Post-revolution,
victimhood was a key element which drove Ennahda’s TJ efforts; however, its search for
accountability was also an attempt to strengthen its legitimacy and political credentials.
The political exclusion draft laws offer an illustration. Unlike vetting initiatives, which
seek to remove personnel based on individual responsibility in gross human rights
violations, political exclusion as promoted by Ennahda (and ultimately renounced by
several members of the party) aimed instead to remove individuals (loosely) affiliated to
the former regime.
Conclusion: a continuing role in changing contexts
TJ was originally developed as a response to transitions in the Southern Cone of Latin
America with the goal to redress gross human rights violations of authoritarian states —
hence it was generally acknowledged that the state with its existing strong institutions
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could and should repair violations. Much of the TJ practice and literature therefore
concentrated on improving state action, although, even in such ‘traditional’ transitions,
non-state actors, including religious leaders and organizations, were instrumental. In
post-conflict, conflict and fragile settings, where TJ measures are currently employed,
the presence and role of non-state actors is heightened. Such contexts often involve
weak or corrupt state institutions, mass poverty and marginalization; moreover,
perpetrators tend to be numerous and include a wide array of non-state actors.
On this account, it appears clear that the involvement of religious actors in TJ is to
continue: as advocates and agents of TJ, pursuing an agenda of reconciliation, or seeking
more retributive measures, at times animated by economic or political gains; as
perpetrators and accomplices in human rights violations which are to be redressed
through TJ; or as spoilers. The interest of states to call upon religious entities as
advocates or agents of TJ depends upon their potential to lend legitimacy to such
processes, which in turn is intimately linked to their accountability. In that way, as with
TJ in general, there is no on-size-fits-all solution.
A response to this post can be found here.
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